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This paper studies the effects of human and physical capital income taxation on growth,
and examines how these effects depend on the technologies for human capital accumulation and
'leisure". It then derives the normative implications of the analysis for the optimal taxation of
factor incomes. It is shown that in general both capital and labor (human capital) taxes are
growth-reducing. In these cases, the optimal long-run tax on both capital and labor income is
zero. The optimal taxation plan consists of taxing both factors in the short run, and financing
spending in the long run through accumulated budget surpluses.
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Traditionally, optimal taxation has been studied using models in which the growth rate of the
economy is determined by exogenous factors. In such models, tax distortions affect the allocation of
resources and the long-run level of per capita income. When the growth rate of the economy is
endogenously determined, however, tax distortions may affect not only the level of per capita income,
but also its growth rate. This paper studies the optimal taxation of human and physical capital in such
a context.
Initial contributions on optimal dynamic factor taxation considered infinite-horizon exogenous
growth models with a representative agent deriving utility from consumption of final goods and leisure
time. Chamley (1985, 1986) and Judd (1985) showed that, in such models, the optimal tax rate on capital
income is zero in the long run. Given an exogenous stream of public expenditures, in the short run the
optimal tax program requires positive tax rates on both labor and capital income, since both factors are
in semi-fixed supply. In the long run, however, capital income tax rates discourage capital accumulation;
expenditures should be financed only with taxes on labor income since labor/leisure (i.e. the individual's
time endowment) is the only factor in fixed supply.
The Chamley-Judd results about the asymmetric long run taxation of labor and capital might be
significantly modified when human capital is considered as an additional factor of production. If labor
(human capital) is modeled as a reproducible factor and a source of accumulation and growth, it might
be optimal to tax both labor and capital income in a similar way. Lucas (1990) shows that the result
about the zero long-run taxation of capital income is not modified even when human capital accumulation
is the source of long-run growth. He also shows that when the time dcvoted to human capital
accumulation is exogenous, the Chamley-Judd result is obtained again —alllong-run taxation should fall
on labor income. However, he does not derive the implications of his model for the optimal long run
taxation of labor income when the accumulation of human capital is endogenous.
A number of recent papers (Bull 1993a, 1993b and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi l993a, 1993h) have
started to address this issue.t These papers show that there are conditions under which the optimal
taxation of both capital gjlaborincome is zero in the long run. This implies that taxation on both
factors must be high enough in the short run so as to accumulate government assets whose returns will
finance long-run government spending. The simplest case where this result is obtained is the following
A number of other contributions do not directly consider the optimal taxation of factor incomes but study the
effects of exogenous changes in tax rates on the growth rate of the economy and the welfare of the representative
agent. These contributions include Rebelo (1991), King and Rebelo (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1993) and Trostel
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one, Suppose that agents derive utility from the consumption of final goods and from leisure, an activity
that ses only raw time as input. Moreover, assume that human and physical capital arc market goods
that arc both perfectly substitutable with consumption and accumulated through savings (Bull 1993a and
the first model in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi l993a). In this case there is nothing peculiar about human
capi:al: it is just a second capital good that is reproducible with the same technology as physical capital.
Therefore, the optimality of the zero long run taxation of capital income applies to both capital factors.
human and physical.
Assuming thet human and physical capital are perfectly symmetric is, however, restrictive.
Indeed, they differ in at least three dimensions: (1) human capital is not substitutable with consumption;
(2) it is a non-market good; and (3) its accumulation depends on a production function with inputs
possibly different from those entering in the production of final goods and physical capital.
Concerning point (I), while most growth models specify physical capital as being perfectly
substitutable with consumption --finalgoods can either be consumed or accumulated in physical capital -
- itis more realistic to assume that human capital cannot be consumed (we can consume cars instead of
using them to produce final goods but we cannot "consume our brain').
Concerning point (2), human capital accumulation should be thought as a non-market activity
whose inputs are not subject to factor income taxation. Specifically, while the labor income deriving from
the time spent in the production of final goods can be taxed, the time input (and implicit labor income)
used in production of human capital is usually not taxed.
Concerning point (3), the production technology for human capital accumulation may use different
inputs and/or have different capital intensity relative to the production technology for final goods. For
example, Lucas (1988, 1990) assumes that human capital is a non-market good whose accumulation has
only human capital (or effective labor, i.e. a time fraction of human capital) as its input. Rebelo (1991)
and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) consider instead two-Sector models where human capital is
produced using both human and physical capital, with factor intensities possibly different from those for
the production of final goods/physical capital, but do not study optimal taxation issues. Jones, Manuelli
and Rossi (1993a, 1993b) consider models where human capital is a non-market good that is produced
with effective human capital and a flQy of market goods, but no direct physical capital input.2 They
show that, if human capital is accumulated with constant returns to its reproducible inputs (human capital
2Thisspecification of the human capital accumulation goes back to Ben Porath (1967) and has been used
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and market goods), both capital and labor income taxes should be zero in the long run. Bull (1993a)
argues that this result is obtained also in a two-sectormodelin which human capital can be "produced'
using physical capital, human capital and intermediate goods as inputs, and/or accumulated through
learning-by-doing in the final goods' sector.
Another interesting issue concerns the specification of the leisure good. In all recent models of
optimal factor taxation (Lucas 1990, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi l993a, l993b and Bull l993a, 1993b),
leisure is considered as a non-market good that requires the use of "raw time" only. An older literature,
however, considered .leisure as a more complex non-market activity requiring the use of both human and
physical capital inputs, in addition to raw time. For example, in Becker (1965)andHeckrnan (1976)
leisure is modeled as 'quality time, defined as human capital times the fraction of the time endowment
that is not spent working or accumulating human capital.3 Extending this idea of leisure as being quality
time, Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) model leisure as a form of "home production' that uses effective
labor and effective physical capital in its production.4 Indeed, most forr,ss of leisure require the use of
capita] goods (think of video-stereo entertainment, sporting equipment and so on).
The discussion above suggests that the way the production technologies for human capital and
leisure are specified may have important implications for the optimal taxation of factor incomes. This
paper extends the analysis of Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (l993a, 1993b) and Bull (l993a) by examining
the role of such technologies. We assume that both human jphysical capital cart enter in the
production of new human capital.3 We are therefore able to analyze whether and how the dxect
inclusion of physical capital inputs in the production of human capital affects the results about the optimal
long run taxation of factor incomes. We also study the implications of alternative specifications of leisure
production for the optimal factor taxation results. Our specification of the leisure function is quite general
and includes as sub-cases the conventional "raw time" specification, the "quality time" model, the "home
Suppose that u, and z, are the fractions of the time endowment spent working and accumulating human capital
respectively; then leisure is defined as L = (1-u, -z,)H, where H is the stock of human capital. See Rebelo (I 991)
for such a formulation of leisure as 'effective labor" in an endogenoua growth model.
Tan.zi and lee (1993) go even further in blurring the distinction between consumption of final goods and
leisure by modelling consumption as an activity that always requires the use of time (in a fixed proportion
technolo' in their model). Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) distinguish "home production" from leisure,
and model the latter as raw time.
See Rebelo (1991) and Mulligan and Sela-i-Martin (1993) for similar specifications of the human capital
accumulation equation. Our formulation includes, as subeases. the specificationIa Lucas (1990) where only
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prrduction" model, and the case of no leisure.6 We restrict our attention to models in which economic
grr.wth is endogenous and that have a balanced growth path.
Our main results, summarized in Table I, are as follows:
(1) If the leisure process is specified as 'raw time —or,more generally, if leisure is
prcduced with constant returns to reproducible factors --thesteady state growth rate of the economy is
a ftnction of both the tax rate on labor and capital income regardless of the way human capital is
accumulated. This dependence of the steady state growth rate on both tax rates implies that the optimal
tax on both human and physical capital should be zero in the long run.Lucas (1990) used this
specification of leisure to show that the optimal long-run tax on capital income is zero, but did not
formally study or derive the optimal tax on labor income. A full solution of his model shows, however,
that both factor income taxes should be zero in the long run,
(2) The steady-state growth rate of the economy in models with no leisure is qualitatively similar
to that in models where the leisure activity is modeled as quality time or "home production, This is
because in the last two cases leisure is a non-market activity produced with constant returns to scale to
reproducible factors, and can therefore be reinterpreted as a non-market consumption good.
(3) Under the three specifications for leisure described above (no leisure, quality time and home
production), the human capital accumulation function has important implications for the dependence of
growth rates on factor income taxes. In particular, if human capital is produced with both human and
physical capital (with CRS in the two inputs), the steady state growth rate of the economy depends on
both factor tax rates, Therefore, in this ease a zeo long-run taxation of both labor and capital income
will be optimal. However, if human capital accumulation uses human capital oni'y (with CRS), the steady
state growth rate of the economy will not depend on either factor income tax rate. When leisure takes
6Thereare, of course, a number of other interesting issues regarding the optimal long run taxation of capital
that we do not address here. First, if government expenditure is endogenous and productive —forexample, when
it enters in the production function for final or capital goods —thelong run optimal tax on capital might not be zero
(see Barro (1990), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a, t993b), Judd (1990), Thu (1992) and Corsett.i (1992)),
Second, if there are externalities in the production of final goods, a,s in Romer (1987) or in the production of human
capital, as in Lucas (1988), the optimal tax plan might require subsidies to the activities with positive externalities
(see Yuen (1991)). Third, there are interesting optimal taxation issues in stochastic settings (see Judd (1990), King
(t990), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (199ta), Zhu (1992) and Corsetti (1992)). Fourth, in the presence of rents
generated by factors in fixed supply (such as labor in models without leisure) it may be optimal to tax capital in tbe
long run if there are limits on the taxation of rents (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi l993b). Fifth, there arc papers
studying indirect taxation, in addition to factor income taxation (see Bull (1993a), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a,
b) and Mileai-Ferretti and Roubini (1994b)). Finally, there are interesting issues of optimal taxation in open
economy endogenous growth models; we address these issues in a companion paper (Milesi Ferretti and Roubini
(1994a)); see also, Rebelo (1992), Ituiter and Kletzcr (1991), Correla (1992), Ra.zin and Yuen (1992),Optimal Taxation in Endogenous GrowthModels 5
theform of"homeproduction or qualitytimebothfactor income taxeswill reduce the ratio between the
steady state consumption of market goods andthe consumptionof the leisure activity.
(4) When human capita! is produced only withhumancapital, the optimal long run taxationof
labor and capital will depend on the model of leisure considered. If leisure is modeled as 'qualitytime
or "home production", the growth rate of the economy does not depend on factor taxes but the steady
state physical to human capital ratio depends on both tax rates. Since tax rates on both factors create an
intertemporal distortiott, the optimal long run tax on both human and physical capital will be zero in these
cases. In the model without leisure, the tax on phytical capital affects the steady state physical to human
capital ratio but the tax on human capital does not; in the long run the tax on labor does not create any
intertemporal or intratemporal distortion. In this sense, in the long-run the tax on labor is lump-sum:
it is therefore optimal to tax labor but not physical capital in the long run.
(5) If the government is constrained in its borrowing ability by a balanced budget constraint
capital and labor income should be taxed at the same positive rate in the long run whenever it is optimal
tohave zerolong run taxation of labor and capital income with an unconstrained government.7
In summary, our results imply thattheoptimal long-runtaxon both capital labor income is
zero (or symmetric if government borrowing is not allowed) under general conditions regarding the
production of human capita! and the specification of the leisure activity. In our setting, the only case in
which the long run tax on capital is zero while the one on labor is positive is that of a model without
leisure and with human capital produced with human capital only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our general setup, and in
Section 3 we solve for the competitive market equilibrium. In Section 4 we discuss the conditions under
which the balanced growth rate of the economy and lung-run factor allocations depend on the tax rates
on capital and labor income. Section 5 presents the solution to the governments optimal taxation
problem, and, Section 6 concludes.
2. THEMODEL
We consider a three-sector economy. The first sector produces final goods (and physical capital);
the second produces human capital and the third produces a non-market good -. home production or
See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992a,1992b) foroptimaltaxation analyses in which the government behavior
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"qual,ty time.
2.1. Technology
Physical output is produced with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology that uses human
capital 11 and physical capita] K as inputs. The technology is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:
(I)
where v (u) is the fraction of physical (human) capital devoted to the production of goods. The capital
stock is assumed to depreciate at the rate 6.
Human capital is also produced with a CRS technology that uses both human and physical capita]
as inputs, as in Rebelo (1991). Ti depreciates at a rate 6, equal for simplicity to the rate of depreciation
of physical capital.9 The production ft,nction is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas as well:'0
II B(x,K (z,H,)t_B —6J-I (2)
where x (z) is the fraction of physics] (human) capital devoted to the accumulation of human capital. In
equations (I) and (2) we have implicitly assumed that the point-in-time technologies" are linear: if a
fraction v of the capital stock is employed in the production of final goods, the 'effective capital" is vK.
This assumption is not necessary for our results: the crucial assumption is that there are CRS in physical
and human capital, the reproducible factors.''
2.2. The goverr,Jnenr
The government needs to finance an exogenously given path of public expenditure, using factor
income taxation and bonds. Without loss of generality, we assume that government bonds are tax-
exempt. The instantaneous budget constraint faced by the government is given by:
The specification of the first two sectors is similar to Rebelo (1991), Mulligan and Sala-i-Mai-tin (1993) and
CabalId and Santos (1993).
Thi assumption allows the derivation of a siinpte closed-form solution for the growth rate, hut does not affect
the qualitative suture of the results.
Our results generalize to the case in which the technologies are CRS with positive cross-derivatives. See
Rebelo (1991) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993b).
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) discuss more in detail the role of the point-In-Line technoIoges.Optimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 7
(3)
where B are government bonds, r1istheir rate of interest and T,istotal revenue Out of taxation. The
usual no Porizi game condition applies. In every period, the resource constraint of the economy is given
by:
(4)
whereCisprivate consumption and G is government expenditure.
2.3.Private agents
Theeconomy is inhabited by identical atomistic agents. They choose consumption, investment




whereIa the rate of time preference, Iisleisure time and Lis"leisure activity', that could include for
example home production. Thia maximization is subject to the constraint on human capital accumulation
given by (2) and to the consumer's budget constraint:
R,K(l-r)s',K,.R7(l -r7)u,H,.r,B, -C,-E, -- ÔK,￿ 0 (6)
wnereR, X°, r and rH are the rates of return and the tax rates on capital and labor income,
respectively. Clearly total tax revenues Tare equal to + 7R"1uH.
Theleisure activity ('home production') uses human and physical capital as inputs, with a Cobb-
Douglas technology:
L,=[(I — v, —x,)K,]7 (w,H,) (7)
wherew is the fraction of time devoted to 'home production. Each individual's time endowment is
normalized to one:
(8)
Weassume that the instantaneous utility function takes a Constant lntertemporal Elasticity ofOp naI To,.xation in Ersdogenous Growth Models 8
Subt itution (dES) form:
(C1L)'8 u(C,l,,L)= -I
1—0 (9)
u(C,,1 ,L)=IogC1 eIog1 + nlogL, 0 =1
where 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)2 The utility function is similar to
the ne in Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), arid its functianal form has hsen shown to be
consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path by King, Plosser and Rehelo (1938). Various
ru es can be identified. When r =0,we have a standard formulation of the utility function in which
eiswe is 'raw time", as in most endogenous growth models with leisure (Lucas 990, Jones, Manuelli
and Rossi 1993a, 1993b, Bull 1993a). Since this is the most widely studied case, we will start first with
specifications of 'he leisure activity where capital inputs (both human and physical) enter in the production
of leisure in addition to raw time. In particular, when =0 and s>0, leisure is equivalent to a form of
"home production", as in Greenwood and l-Iercowitz (1991). A special case of this occurs when -y=O,
so that leisure is 'quality time", is in Becker (1965), Heckman (1976) and Rcf'elo (1991).
2.4, Firms
Firms rent capital from households at the rate of interest R" and hire labor at the wage rate




2Thequalitative narure of our results would be unchanged if we adopted the more general specification:
U(C,L,1) =(I3)tCL11] -





Therepresentative consumer takes the paths of rKandasgiven and chooses the paths of C.
B,K, H, 1, u, v, x, w, ztomaximize (5) subjectto(2) and(6).We will now focuson the case in which
leisure is 'home production'. Analytically, this implies = 0, so that 1 = 0 and w = J - ii - z (by
equation 8). Suhcascs are the 'quality time' model (-y = 0) and the 'no leisure' model (i = 0). We
will consider the 'raw time' model of leisure ( > 0, ,0) in Section IV.
Defining private non-human wealth X, K + B,, we can re-write (6) as follows:
r,X,—[r, ö _R,K(l —r)v,]K, .R7(I —r7)u,H,
—C,￿ . (12)













(1--y)ii C, 1 8)
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(1e'CL'=p B(l -)H (19)
l—u1—z,
I r zR,
The remaining two FOCs are the constraints (2) and (6). Equation (13) states that the shadow price of
consumption (physical capital) must equal the marginal utility of consumption in every period. Equation
(14) is the FOCforcapital accumulation: the rate of change of the shadow price of consumption must
equal the marginal product of capital net of tax, which must also equal the rate of return on government
bonds. Equation (15) is the corresponding FOC for human capital accumulation, relating the chance in
the shadow price of human capital to its marginal rate of return. Equation (16) and (18) describe the
optimal allocation of physical and human capital respectively between production of market goods and
"horns production'. Finally, conditions (17) and (19) describe the optimal allocation of physical and
human capital between the 'education' sector and home production.
The transversa]ity conditions are:
lim,.X,K1=0 (20) lim1. pII, 0
Ustng equations (10), (11) and (l6)-(19) we can express the sectoral allocation of factors as a
function of technology parameters arid taxes:
1 -v,-x (21)
U,1—0l_r7Z, I—a Y l_r'l,z,
Accordingto (21), when the tax on !abor income (capital incomc) rises (falls), he capital/labor ratio in
the sector producing goods rises with respect to the capital/labor ratio in the sector producing human
capital and with respect to the capital/labor ratio in the home production sector, It is interesting to note
that changes in tax rates docause changes in the relative capital intensity between the education sector
and the home production sector, since both these sectors are riot directly taxed.
This economy will exhibit a balanced growth path, along which consumption, physical capital and
human capital grow at the same rate, while factor allocations (u, v, x and z) remain constant.tm3 Log-
differentiating (13) and using the fact that factor allocations are constant along the balanced growth path,
IS Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), Caba1l and SanLos (1993) and Barro and Sala-i -Martin (1994) give the




where time subscripts for variables along the balanced growth path have been omitted. Along such path,
the shadow prices of physical and human capital must decline at the same rate. Equating (14) and (15)
wecan determine the physical to human capital ratios in the production, human capital and home'
sectors along the balanced growth path:
-'(l -Y)
-(lI)l (23)
(1-v-x)K [D(l -(l -)]
(1—u—z)H
where the terms D, are constants involving the technology parameters a, fi,Aand B, reported in the
Appendix.t4 The ratio of market" consumption to leisure can be determined in an analogous fashion,
and is given by:
=[D3 (1 -?f)1O)(l -
Clearly, higher factor income tax rates will tend to shift consumption from market goods to Thome
production.





The steady state net real interest rate can be determined using (10), (14) and (23):
14 If the depreciation rates of human and physical capital were different, it would 001 be possible to express
these ratios in closed form.Oprimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 12
r [D(l )wt (I _l)$(l)] -5
(26)
Etoations(23)-(26) show that bothtax rates will in general distort the allocation of factors between
sotors and reducetherate of growthof the economy.
4. FAXATION AND LONG-RUN GROWTH
We will now-discuss the main results of thebalancedgrowthsolution of our model. In particular,
weanalyze the conditions under which the balanced growth solutions of the model depend on the tax rates
on labor (s's) and capital income (rK).
Proposilion I P/hen physical capital does not e,trer in the production of hurrtan capital (d =Q), the
steady stale growth rate of the econonry is independent of thetaxrates on capital odlaborincome
regardless of how the leisure activity is modeled. In this case.-
C I___[B-5-p) (27)
C O-,(l—O)
Proof Sec equation 25.
The intuition for this result is simple. If human capital is produced with human capital only, as
increase in the labor tax rate will reduce the return to current work effort but it will also reduce the return
to human capital accumulation (and the return to the leisure activity) by the same amount. Therefore,
the fraction of time spent studying --whichin this case determines the growth rate --isunchanged.
The growth rate defined by equation (27) is equal (up to a constant of proportionality) to the
balanced groivth rate of economies Ia Lucas (1988) where human capital accumulation is CRS in human
capital only and there is no leisure (s=O) (see I3arro and Sala-i-Martin, 1994). Our anaiycis generalizes
that result by showing that, in the Lucas case of =O, a qualitatively similar steady state solution is
obtained when we consider economies where leisure is introduced and modeled as 'quality time' or
'home production' -Specifically,the growth rate will be independent of the technological parameters for
the production of final goods and physical capital (a and A) while the real interest rate will be
independent of preferences and related to the productivity level of human capital itt the education sector,
given by B.Optimal Taxation in EndogenousGrowth Models 13
Proposition2 The growth rate of the economy is independent of the capita! insensiry of the production
of leisure ('y,). That is, the 'quality time and 'home production' models of leisure are equivalent with
respect to the steady stale growth rate oft/ic economy.
Ps-oof Seeequation (25).II
This proposition suggests that, as long as leisure is produced with constantreturnsto reproducible
factors, as is the case in the 'quality time' and 'home production' models, what matters for growth is
only the relative preference of agents for leisure relative to consumption (given by the parameter ) and
not the specific form in which the leisure good is produced. In particular, the capital intensity of the
leisure activity (y) has no effects on the growth rate of the economy.
Proposition 3The real interest rate in the 'quality time' and 'home production' models of leisure is
the same as in a model with no leisure (,= 0),while the growth rates are proportional, with a
proportionality ratio (f0/- (1-8))]) that depends only on parameters oft/ic utility function (0 and ii).
Proof See equations (25) and (26).II
A similar result was derived by Rebelo (1991) who i..ompared the growth rates in a model with
leisure as 'quality time' and in a model where an exogenous fiactiori of time is devoted to leisure)5
This equivalence of 'quality time' and 'home production' models of leisure with the case of no leisure
results from the fact that leisure is modeled as a non-market activity produced with constant returns to
scale to reproducible factors. In these two case, leisure can therefore be reinterpreted as a non-market
consumption good and the model is substantially equivalent to one in which there is no leisure.
Proposition 4tV/men theleisureactivity exhibits C'RS in reproducible factors, the ratio bet.veen
consumption and leisure along the balanced growth path is a negative Junction of both tax rates,
regardless oJ.
'Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) show that a model with home production is observationally equivaient
to a model without home production, but with different preferences.Optimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 14
ProofSeeequation(24). II
Theintuition is very simple: when factor income taxes arepositive,individualswill shift
consImption to a non-taxed activity sschas leisure.
Proposition 5When=0,in the model with no leisure the steadystatephysical to human capital ratio
in th: economy is independent of the tax rare on labor income but a negative function of the tat rate on
capital income ,inthe models where leisure is "quality time or "home production this ratio depends
on both factor income tax rates.
Proof From (23), theequilibriumcapital/labor ratio in theeconomyis given by
=- [ca(l_7.x)]r (28) H v B
From Proposition I, we know that whenjl = 0, the fractionz of time spent accumulating human capital
is independent of both tax rates. When y> 0.we can the equality between the first and the third term
in (21)to expressvasa function of uandboth tax rates. Using the economy's resource constraint (4),
we can establish that u,vand v/uarea function of both tax rates. Since from (23) we know that vK/u.J-f
dependsonly on r,itfollows that K/Hisa function of both tax rates. When y = 0, vI;the resource
constraint (4) establishes that uisa function of both tax rates. From equation (28) it follows that K/His
also a function of both tax rates, Finally, when there is no leisure z =I-u;sincezisindapendent of
both tax rates (Proposition I), so is u.Inthis case (28) establishes that K/Hdependsonly on the tax rate
on physical capital.
Intuitively, when leisure is modeled as "quality time" or "home production" the tax on labor
income does not affect the fraction of time spent studying (z), and therefore does not affect the growth
rate. However, it affects the allocation of time between work and leisure activities; in particular, an
increase in the labor tax reduces the fraction of time spent working and increases time spent in the leisure
activity. Therefore, the equilibrium human and physical capital in the economy will be affected by the
labor tax.
Proposition 5 is important for the derivation of the optimal taxation of factors.Iii fact, when
=0 and there is no leisure, the labor tax does not create any intertemporal distortion: it does not affectOptimal Taxationin EndogencusGrowth Models 15
eitherthe growth rate of the economyorthecapital laborratio in the economy.Conversely, if leisure
ismodeled as "qualitytime'or "home production", thelabortax does not affectgrowthbut itcreates
an intertemporal distortion since the economy-wideK/His affected. A tax on capita]incomeis always
distortionary when =0because it affects the physical to human capital ratio regardless of whether there
isleisureornot inthe model.
Proposition 6 When physicalcapital enters in the production of human capital (3 >0), tax rateson
capiosland labor income reduce the long-rungrowthraze of the econcmy. The steadystatephysical to
humancapitalratios in the final goods and human capital sectors vu also depend on both factor tan
rates.
Proof see equation (25).
Theintuition for the proposition is easier to present for the case of no leisure (but is the same
in the equivalentcasesof leisure as 'quality time' or 'home production'). We showed above that when
=0,the return to and the cost of human capital accumulation (i.e. the net of tax wage) are affected
in the same proportion by a change in labor taxes, leaving the time allocation decision unchanged. In
other terms, since the cost of human capital accumulation is effectively tax-deductible, labor income
taxation doesnotaffect the incentive to accumulate human capital." However, if physical capita] is
also usedinthe production of new human capital (fi>0),the return to human capita]is reduced more
than its cost. In particular, the cost of physical capital inputs used in the production of human capital
is not reduced by the labor income tax since these inputs are not tax deductible. More generally, as
suggested by Trostel (1993), if any other inputs in addition to hsiman capita] enter in the production of
human capital, its return will be reduced by more than its cost. Therefore human capital accumulation
will be reduced by an increase in the labor tax rate."
The above results imply that, for the three specifications of the leisure activity considered so far
(the "quality rime", the 'home production' and the 'no leisure" models), the specification of the human
capital accumulation function has important implications for the dependence of growth rates on factor
income taxes. In particular, if human capital is produced with Qth human and physical capital (with
See Trostel (1993) for a detailed presemation of this argument.
'Seealso Bull (1993a) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi(1993b).Opt.'nal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Model5 16
CR in the two inputs), the steady state growth rate of the economy depends on both factor tax rates.
Hos. ever, if human capita] accumulationuses humancapital (y (with CRS), the steady state growth rate
of ftc economy will not depend on either factor income tax rate. When leisure is a good produced with
CR in reproducible factors, both factor income tax rates will shift consumption away from 'market
goocis" arid towards leisure.
\Vhat happens in the ease in which leisure is not produced with constant returns to reproducible
factt.rs 7 One such case —leisuremodeled as s "raw time' activity --isthe one most studied in the
literature. 5 In this case "raw time" is a non-reproducible factor that is constrained by the agent's total
time endowment. As already well known (see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)), such a specification of
leisure is consistent with a balanced growth path only under particular functions] forms for the agent's
utilby. Even in these cases, it is not possible to derive analytically aclosedform solution for the
balanced growth rate of the economy since the first order conditions of the competitive equilibrium are
non near. However, the evaluation of these first order conditions ailows us to infer whether the growth
rate of the economy depends on the factor tax rates or sot:
Proposition 7 If leisure is modeledas'raw rinse' --or,more generally, as an activiry nor produced
with CRS in reproducible factors --thebalanced growth rate of the economy will a!ways depend on the
tax rates on capital and labor income regardless of whether physical capital inputs enter or not in the
production of human capital.
Proof The solution to the consumer maximization problem yields the following (semi-reduced)
expression for the growth rate:
=([D(l- (1-)'(u+z)]) (29)
where D4 is the same constant as in equation (25). The Appendix shows that the growth rate will depend
on both tax rates even when =0,since u and z depend on the tax rates irrespectively of .
Theexpression(29) is very similar to (25) —thegrowth rate for the case in which leisure is
' See Chamley (1986), 1.,ueas (1990),Jones,Manuelli and Rossi (1993a, 19931') and Bull (1993a) for such a
specification of leisure in optimal taxation analyses.Inour general framework, the case of leisure as 'raW time'
corresponds to >0and ,= 0in equation (9).Optimal Taxation in Endogerwus Growth Models 17
"home production. The crucial difference is the term u+z, the share of time. spent working and
accumulatinghuman capital.
Theintuition for the resultcanbemoreeasily obtained byconsideringthe case where$=0, in
whichcasethegrowthratecanbeexpressed asBz -6.9Weshowed above that when there isno
leisure inthemodel orwhenleisure isproducedwithconstant returns to reproducible factorsthe steady
state real interest rate depends only on the technology of human capital (B). In thosecases,an increase
in the stock of human capital increases the productivity of all the time endowment,includingthe time
spent in leisure activities. Moreover, in this case the return to and the cost of human capital accumulation
(i.e. the net of tax wage) are affected in the same proportion by a change in labor taxes so that the time
spent accumulating human capital does not change.
When leisure is modeled as "raw time" instead, an increase in human capital will raise the
productivity of time spent producing goods or accumulating human capital hut will not affect the marginal
utility of leisure. Therefore, the return to the accumulation of human capital will now depend on the time
spent in leisure activities. Since the time spent in leisure is a function of the relative preferences over
consumption and leisure, the equilibrium real interest rate will now also depend on preferences and not
only on technology.
Consider now the effects of an increase in the labor tax: while the relative cost of and return to
working versus accumulating human capital are unchanged, the return to the leisure activity is increased
since the time spent in leisure is untaxed. The ensuing increase in time spent in leisure reduces the time
spent accumulating human capital and therefore its return. The reduction in the return to investment in
human capital will then imply that the equilibrium real interest rate is reduced and therefore the rae of
growth of the economy is reduced in the steady state. A similar argument can he made for the effects
of changes in capital income taxes on growth. It then follows that, even if =0,in the model with
leisure as raw time" the growth rate of the economy will depend on the tax rates on both factors of
production. A similar argument can be used to show that the growth rate depends on the two tax rates
whenis positive.
The result that in the "raw time" leisure model the growth rate is a function of both tax rates
independently of whetheris zero or not is in contrast to the results obtained in the models without
leisure or with leisure produced with CRS in reproducible factors. In those models, the growth rate of
the economy is dependent on both tax rates when $>0 but independent of them when $= 0.
See Rebclo(1991) for an explanation along the same tines.Optimal Tszaation inEndogenous Growth Models 18
5.OPTIMALTAXATION ANALYSIS
So far, we have discussed the conditions under which the growth rate of the economy and the
capital ratios in the various sectors depend on the tax rates on labor and capital income. We have not
yet determined the conditions under which it wiN be optimal to have a zero long-run taxation of a factor
of production. A formal analysis of optimal tax rates on the two factors requires the solution of a
Ramsey planner's problein (Ramsey, 1927) where the government chooses the path of tax rates with
the purpose of maximizing the representative agent's welfare, taking into account the cptimizing behavior
of this agent. We now turn to this problem.
5.1 TheRamsey planner's problem
Thegovernment has to take into account the optimizing behavior of private agcnt.s when deciding
the optimal structure of taxation. One way to solve the optimal taxation problem is the following: the
government chooses taxes so as to maximize the consumer's indirect utility function, subject to the first-
order conditions of the consumer's maximization problem, as in Charnley (1986). A different and simpler
approach, based on Lucas and Stokey (1983) is also possible. This approach consists in formulating the
government's problem asarestrictedRamsey planner problem,in which the government chooses
quantities directly, subject to the consumer's intertemporal budget constraint and to the constraints related
to the consumer's optimal allocation of human and physical capital. These constraints are derived from
the consumers first-order conditions; the latter, together with the firm's FOCs, are used to eliminate
factor returns and taxes from the constraints so as to express the problem in terms of quantities only.
The optimal quantities chosen by the government will then implicitly detemsimie tax rates and factor
returns. This is the approach followed by Lucas (1990); Yuen (1990); Cltari, Clsristiano and Kchoe
(1991a,b); l3ull (1993a, b), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a, b) among others.
The optimal taxation analysis, formally developed in the Appendix, yields the following three
reaulLs:2°
Proposition 8 When$ >0,the optimal tax rate on both human and physical capital is zero utthelong
russ both when leisure is C'RS in reproducible factors (€ = 0, sj>0,) and when leisure does not yield
utility = 0).
20As other optimal taxation studies, our analysis does not prove fonnally existence and uniqueness of the
optimal taxation plan.Optimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 19
ProofSeethe Appendix.H
Heuristically,the proof consists in guessing that both taxes are equal to zero along a balanced
growth path, and then verify that this is a solution to the syst2m of equations given by the first-order
conditions and the constraints.2'
The intuition for the proposition when > 0 can be easily understood by considering the relation
between the growth rate of the economy and the tax rates. The analysis of Charn]ey suggests that any
tax that distorts a long run intertemporal decision should be Set equal to zero. In an endogenouS growth
framework, any tax distortion that reduces the long-run growth rate of the economy will have la.rge and
permanent costs (in terms of present discounted value of lout consumption and utility) and should
therefore be Set equal to zero. Since the balanced growth rate of the economy is dependent on both tax
rates in models without leisure and in models where leisure is CRS in reproducible factors when >0,
it follows that the optimal tax on labor and capital income should be zero in these cases.
The basic principle that any tax the affects long run growth should be set to zero in the long run
leads to the next proposition regarding optimal taxation in the specifications of leisure as raw time.
Proposition 9Inthe raw time -modelof leisure, the optimal long-ru,, lax rate on capital and labor
income is zero regardless of whether capital inputs enter or not in the production of human capita! ae,
regardless of the value of $).
ProofSee the Appendix. II
Animmediate implication of this Proposition is that the optimal tax on labor income in the Lucas
(1990) modl is zero when the accumulation of human capital is endogenous.
While a dependence of the long-run growth rate on a tax rate implies that such a tax rate should
be Set equal to zero in the long run, what can we say about the cases in hich longrun growth is
independent of tax rates ? Such independence is obtained, in our model, in three models of leisure (when
leisure is CRS in reproducible factors and when there is no leisure) whenever =0.
There is an important difference between models where leisure is produced with CRS in
SiSeeBull (1993a) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (l993b) for a similar methodology.Optimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 20
reproducible factors and models in which there is no leisure, as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 10 When =0,the optimal long run lax rate on capital inco,ne will be equal to zero; when
the leisure activity is 'quality rime' or 'home production' the optima! long run tax rate on labor income
will be zero, while it will be positive when leisure does not bring utility.
Proof See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. When leisure is produced with CRS in reproducible
factors, the taxes on labor and capital income diatort the economy's long-run aggregate capital/labor ratio,
as proven in Proposition 5. Therefore labor and capital income should be untaxed in the long run. When
there is no leisure in the model, however, a tax on labor income does not distort the capital/labor ratio
and resource allocation choices, because it reduces the opportunity Cost of human capital accumulation
in the same proportion as the returns to education, and therefore leaves the allocation of labor between
production and education unchanged. Indeed, in the long run the labor tax is non distonionary, and
should therefore be set at a positive level. The optimal long-run tax on capital income is instead zero,
because it distorts the economy's long-run capital/labor ratio.
We do not study the complicated issue of optimal taxation along the transition to the balanced
growth path.Clearly, when long-run taxes are zero, the government needs to accumulate budget
surpluses in the short run in order to finance government expenditure with the accumulated assets in the
long run. Unlike other models in which physical capital can be used only itt production, we speculate
that the taxation of human and physical capital along the transition path will be relatively similar. The
reason is that taxing physical capital at rates close to 100% will induce private agents to shift capital to
the untaxed education and home production sectors. In other terms, while the supply of K is relatively
inelastic in the short run, v responds to current tax rates.
5.2 Growth-Maximizing Tax Policies with a Balanced Budget
As we already mentioned, optimal taxation plans in dynamic growth models generally feature
high factor income taxes in the short run (when factors are in semi-fixed supply) and lower ossibly
zero) taxes in the long run. Given an exogenous path of government expenditures this optimal taxation
plan consists of taxing both factors in the short run, and financing spending in the long run through
accumulated budget surpluses. This implies that the government should be able to accumulate enoughOptimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 21
assets in the short run to be able live off their returninthe long run. Such an accumulation of assets by
the government is clearly not empirically realistic.
Itis therefore interesting to consider the nature of an optimal taxation plan when the ability of
the government to borrow or lend is restricted. We study which tax policies will he growth maximizing
(i.e. welfare maximizing) in the long run in the limiting case where no intertemporal borrowing is
allowed so that the government has to balance its budget in every period. We consider only the steady
state and assume that government spending is a const5nt fraction of output. If the government has to run
a balanced budget in.every period, its budget constraint becomes:
garK.(lc471 (30)
where g is the steady state ratio of government spending to output. We can then consider which steady
state tax policies will maximize the growth rate by maximizing the growth solution (25) (for the general
case of fi > 0) subject to the above goverrinient budget constraint (30). The solution of this problem is:
(31)
The equation shows that the growth-maximizing capital and labor income tax rates are equal, i.e. a
common income tax on all factor incomes is optimal. The result is interesting because it suggests that,
as long as the growth rate of the economy isaffected byboth tax rates, the optimal long run tax policy
is to tax both factors similarly. As seen in section 5.1, if the behavior of the government is not
constrained (so that it can borrow and lend), labor and capital should he taxed at the same long run rate
of zero. Similarly, for the functional forms we use, if the government is constrained to run a budget
balance in every period, the optimal long run tax on labor and capital will still he the for both
factors and equal to the government spending to output ratio that has to be financed in every period.
More generally, the finding of a long run dependence of the growth rate on both factors breaks
the asymmetry between labor and capital that lead Chamley to the result that capital income should not
be taxed and labor income should be taxed in the long run. If growth depends on both tax rates, the
nature of optimal (growth-maximizing) policies is to tax the two factors in a symmetric fashion.
6.CUNCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have considered the role of the human capital accumulation technology and the
nature of the leisure activity in determining the optimal taxation of labor and capital. Traditional optimalOptimal Taxrnf on in Endogenous Growth Models 22
taxation analyses in exogenous growth models stressed that the tax rate on capital income should be zero
in the long run, while the one on labor should be positive. We have shown that in endogenous growth
models this result is replicated only under restrictive specifications of human capital accumulation and
leisure production. Under more general specifications of these processes, capital and labor income should
be taxed similarly in the long run. In particular, our results imply that the optimal long-run tax on both
capital labor income is zero (or symmetric if borrowing is not allowed) under very general conditions
regarding the production of human capital and the specification of the leisure activity. The only case in
which the long run tax on capita] is zero while the one on labor is positive is that of a model without
leisure and with human capital produced with human capital only.
This optimal taxation analysis, like most its predecessors, ignores important time-consistency
issues, since the government is assumed to choose irrevocably an optimal tax plan at period zero.
However, time consistency appears more tractable in this model, since physical capital has alternative
uses that are non taxable and therefore confiscatory tax rates are not feasible. A general hut unrealistic
feature of the optimal taxation solution is the accumulation of budget surpluses in the short run to finance
government expenditure without recourse to distortionary taxation in the long run. This result is due to
the fact that reproducible factors are supplied relatively inelastically in the short run but elastically in the
long run. Future research should re-examine the issue of dynamic optimal taxation subject to a realistic
set of restrictions on government's behavior.
The analysis in this paper is framed in a closed economy context and does not study indirect
taxation. In Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1994a) we consider optimal taxation issues in a small open
economy, while in Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1994b) we examine the impact of consumption taxes on
growth and factor allocations, and its implications for optimal taxation.
22 Ass exceptios is Benhabib and \'elasco (1994).Optimal Ta.ration in EndogenousGrowthModels 23
APPENDIX
Al.Value of parameters in equations (23)-(25)
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A2. The raw time' model of leisure
When leisure isexpressedas "raw time', the consumer's problemtakes the followingform:
,.(C /)8
MaxU=J''-1
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Evaluation of the first-order conditions along the balanced growth path yields the following expression
for economic growth:
=([D(l-8(1 -)8(( z)]-p6) (A2)
where D4 is the same constant as in equation (25).Thisexpression is very similar to the growth rate for
the case in which leisure is "home production" (equation 25). The crucial difference is the term u+z.
the share of time spent working and accumulating human capital. The values of factor allocations u, vOptimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 24
and z are determined implicitly by the following three relations:
(A3)
uI-n 1_1.HZ








whichis obtained from the resource constraint of the economy. g is the ratio of public expenditure to
output. The dependence of u and z --andtherefore of the growth rate --onboth tax rates is clear from
equations (A3)-(A5). When =0,v =I(all capital is used in production of goods) and from (A2) and
(A4)itis straightforward to show that the growth rate is given by Bz -6, where zisdetermined implicitly
by:
csBz (I .l.K)+!_!B(.l —Oz)+ô(O—l)—P(1 _7N)1—g (A6)
BOz—ô(O—l)+p (O—l)(Bz—5)+p
andis clearly a function of both tax rates.
A3.Optimal taxation when leisure is 'home productiou'
Inthis Appendix we prove formally the optimality of zero long-mn taxes on both human and
physical capital for a model in which leisure takes the form of home production. The first step consists
in expressing the consumer's intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) as a function of quantities only. By
integrating forward the Instantaneous consumer budget constraint (12) and imposing the tranaversality
condition (20) and the no-Ponzi game condition, we obtain the following interteroporal budget constraint:
JeJ[C1+(1 _v,)R,K(1 _r)K,-u,R7(1-7')li,]dtK5
(A7)Optimal Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 25
where ris defined as in (14)andinitial debt B0 has been assumed to be zero without loss of generality.





The differentia] equations for human capital accumulation (2) anditsshadow price (IS) can beintegrated
forwardto determine the value of the representative agent's human wealth. Using equations (16)-(19)
human wealth can be expressed as follows:
H0JX[R,'(l—r)H,(1z,)R,R(l —r)K,xjds (A9)
Adding(A9) and (A7) the consumer's IBC becomes:
(AlO)
The terms in K, and H, inside the integral sign represent tue "value" of home production, while the RHS
is the consumer's initial human and non-human wealth. Taxes can be implicitly expressed as a function






where RH andR'aredetermined by thefirma'first-orderconditions (equations 0 and II).
Substituting (All) and (Al2) into (A 10) we obtain:
JX,c,(l
(Al3)
Equation (Al5) simply statesthatthe PDV of consumption --includingmarket goods andThome
production --has tobe equaltothe consumer's total wealth. This is an'implementability constraint"
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Inthese models it is well known that, although the totalsupplyof human capital is inelastic, its
'taxable' supply is elastic—if labor taxes are very high in the initial period, agents will devote their time
to human capita] accumulation and home production. It should be noted that in our setup, unlike in other
papers, such as Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990), the government would j be able to corifiscate
physical capital even if it could tax its return at more than 100%. The reason is that physical capita] has
alternative uses -- i: can be employed for home production and for the production of human capital.
Using (AS) to substitute for X, and X0; and substituting forfrom the consumer's FOCs, we can
re-write (A 13) as follows:
J e'(C,L,")'dI
=
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Wenow turn to the determination of the additional constraints that the consumer's behavior
imposes on the government. The remaining FOCs of the consumer's optimal plan are equation (2) and
equations (13)-(19). Of those, equation (13) determines X; equation (18) defines implicitly the tax rate
on human capital; equations (14) and (16) determine implicitly the tax rate on physical capital and a
constraint associated with physical capital accumulation:
Jo, (1 v-x)K
ds 2_[OlogC-i(l —O)logL,-OlogC0.i(l -O)logL0*(óp)t)(A16)
which is obtained substituting (All) into (A8) and taking logs. Equation (17) and (19) dctcrnsine and
a Constraint that relates the capital intensities of home production and education
1 1 —u,—z, (Al7) $ l-'yz,
and equation (15) and (2) determine a constraint associated with human capital accumulation:
R,(l-r)H,(l -$)B [']JeJ'"R(I-r7)Ji,(l -)ds
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TheLHSof this expression is the gain for the consumer if she increases marginally her labor supply u,.
This must be equal to the resources the consumer would havehadby devoting one more unit to the
accumulation of human capital (R}IS). Note that these resources include not only the additional income
from the time spent producing market goods (u,), but also from the time spent in 'home production'
because a higher human capital stock increases home production. Using (A7) and (A 12) the constraint
(AIS) can be written as:




The government's restricted Ramsey plan consists in maximizing consumer's utility subject to the
economy's resource constraint (4); the human capital "production' technology (2); the implementahiliry
Constraint (A14); and the other constraints imposed by the consumer's behavior -.(Al6),(Al7) and
(A 19). Lethe the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability constraint, and define
W, =(I O)(CL7)t. It is easy to see that the planner's problent can be re-formulated as
follows:
Max Je'W,dr-i/ (A20)
subject to he constraints (4), (2), (A16), (A17) and (A19) which we associate the multipliers X,, ,',,
and u, respectively. Let c =xK/zHand t =vK/uJ-falong the balanced growth path, and define a'
as the value of the variable s, discounted by its long-run growth rate, along the balanced growth path,
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Comparing these FOC with those of the consumer problem along the balajiced growth path, it Is
immediate from (14) and (A22) that the long-run tax rate on capital has to be zero. This also implies that
the LHS of equation (A24) is equal to zero (see equation(Al1)). Evaluating equations (A23)-(A27) we
then obtain that the three multipliers u, and*areequal to zero. From equations (A26) and (A 12)
we conclude that the optimal tax on human capital is zero as well. The intuition for the fact that the three
constraints imposed by the consumer's optimality conditions on the government's behavior are not binding
in the long run (t7= = 0)is the following. In the long run,== 0:hence all
distortions are eliminated and the consumer's optimality constraints do not restrict the government's
resource allocation choice.
The proof of optimality for the case in which =0and for when leisure is 'raw time' is
perfectly analogous, and is available from the authors upon request.
A4. Optimal taxation when =0and there is no leisure
In this case the optimal taxation solution requires a limit on the tax rate on physical capital, since
the latter has no alternative uses. The constraint associated with this limit will be binding in the initial
periods, but not in the long run --ifitwere, agents would devote no resources to capital accumulation.







wherethe last condition ensures that rK￿ I








wherea star indicates the value of a variable along the balanced growth path, discounted by ta long-run
growth rate.Equating (30) and (31) we determine the long-run capital/labor ratio in production.
Comparing it with the one resulting from the consumer'c optinality conditions (equation (28) with v=1)
proves that the long-run tax on physical capital should be equal to zero. Evaluation of the consumer's
FOCsalongthe balanced growth path shows that the tax on labor income is nondisrorrionary in the long
run: asshown in Propositions 1 and 5, the labor tax does not affect the growth rate and the allocation
of factors. It follows that along the balanced growth path the tax on labor should be positive.Opnir.aJ Taxation in Endogenous Growth Models 30
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